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Warren D. Hannah

Director – Federal Regulatory Relations Local Telecommunications Division EX PARTE

September 26, 1996

Mr. William F. Caton Acting Secretary Federal Communications Commission 1919 M Street, N.W. Room 222 Washington, D.C. 20554 RECEIVED

SEP 2 6 1996

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMUNICATIONS

OFFICE OF SECRETARY

RE:

In the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service -

CC Docket No. 96-45

Dear Mr. Caton:

On September 24, 1996, representatives of Sprint Corporation met with The Honorable Julia Johnson, Commissioner of the Florida Public Service Commission and a member of the Federal-State Joint Board in the above referenced matter. Representing Sprint Corporation were Messrs. Jim Sichter and Larry Millard.

Sprint's proposals, filed on April 12, 1996, in the above referenced proceeding were discussed during the meeting. The attached information was used during the meeting. This ex parte notice is filed today since the meeting was held in Tallahassee, Florida.

It is requested that this information be made a part of the record in this matter. Two copies of this letter, in accordance with Section 1.1206(a)(1) of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, are provided for this purpose.

Please call on the above telephone number if there are any questions.

Sincerely,


Warren D. Hannah


Attachment

c: The Honorable Julia Johnson, Commissioner, Florida Public Service Commission, Tallahassee, Florida

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UNIVERSAL SERVICE SPRINT'S PLAN FOR SUPPORT






ACCESS REFORM AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE

- Unsustainability of internal (Implicit) Subsidies
- Impact of Access Reform





UNSUSTAINABILITY OF INTERNAL (IMPLICIT) SUBSIDIES

Maintaining Universal Service Support through internal "cross subsidies" is Inconsistent with the Telecom Act, and is Incompatible with, and Unsustainable in, a Competitive Market Place

- Problems with Embedding "Subsidies" in LEC Prices
 - Neither explicit nor targeted
 - Artificially low rates (for the subsidized services) are a barrier to competitive entry
 - Artificially high rates (for the services providing the subsidy)...
 - Provide incorrect price signals to potential entrants
 - Are unsustainable





- The Telecom Act of 1996 requires incumbent LECs to provide unbundled Network Elements to competitive LECS at cost-based rates
 - Creating an arbitrage opportunity to the extent that the total revenues (Local and Access) generated by an element under the existing rate structures exceed the costs for that unbundled element
 - And, ultimately, undermining the cross-subsidies embedded in existing rate structures
- New Entrants can undermine Access Rates
 - If rate level too high (above economic costs)
 - If rate structures inefficient
 - e.g., per MOU recovery of fixed or NTS costs 5

Carrier Common Line Revenues Disaggregated by Customer Usage

Usage	Access	% of		CCL Revenue	% of	C	CL Revenue
Segment MOU/Month	Lines	Total		(Inter & Intra)	Total		per Line
Residental							
0	70,447	2.5%	\$	-	0.0%	\$	-
0-100	767,815	27.2%	\$	673,485	3.1%	\$	0.88
100-200	442,665	15.7%	\$	1,326,621	6.2%	\$	3.00
200-300	324,892	11.5%	\$	1,591,209	7.4%	\$	4.90
300-1000	939,235	33.3%	\$	9,753,185	45.5%	\$	10.38
1000-2000	226,949	8.0%	\$	5,399,230	25.2%	\$	23.79
2000-5000	50,405	1.8%	\$	2,335,103	10.9%	\$	46.33
5000+	2,358	0.1%	\$	348,841	1.6%	\$	147.94
TOTAL	2,824,766	100.0%	\$	21,427,675	100.0%	\$	7.59
Business							
O O	193,955	14.3%	¢	_	0.0%	e	_
0-100	567,692	42.0%		363,886	3.5%		0.64
100-200	152,528	11.3%	-	477,805	4.5%		3.13
200-300	94,035	7.0%		493,989	4.7%	•	5.25
300-1000	ŕ	17.4%		•	25.8%		11.52
	235,348			2,710,393			
1000-2000	67,702	5.0%		1,938,895	18.4%	-	28.64
2000-5000	31,536	2.3%		1,993,250	19.0%	-	63.21
5000+	9,617	0.7%	\$	2,534,321	<u>24.1%</u>	2	263.53
TOTAL	1,352,413	100.0%	\$	10,512,539	100.0%	\$	7.77

Note: Based on November 1995 billing records for United & Centel Florida, CT&T Centel of North Carolina, Ohio, United & Centel Texas, Illinois and Missouri





Local Switching "Subsidy"* Disaggregated by Cusomer Usage



Usage Segment MOU/Month	Access Lines	% of <u>Total</u>	Local Switching (Inter & Intra)	% of Total	Local Switching per Line
Residental					
0	70,447	2.5%	\$ -	0.0%	\$ -
0-100	767,815	27.2%	\$ 316,420	2.9%	\$ 0.41
100-200	442,665	15.7%	\$ 642,250	5.9%	\$ 1.45
200-300	324,892	11.5%	\$ 782,421	7.1%	\$ 2.41
300-1000	939,235	33.3%	\$ 4,947,455	45.1%	\$ 5.27
1000-2000	226,949	8.0%	\$ 2,839,538	25.9%	\$ 12.51
2000-5000	50,405	1.8%	\$ 1,268,355	11.6%	\$ 25.16
5000+	2,358	0.1%	\$ 182,012	1.7%	\$ 77.19
TOTAL	2,824,766	100.0%	\$ 10,978,451	100.0%	\$ 3.89
Business					
0	193,955	14.3%	\$ •	0.0%	\$ -
0-100	567,692	42.0%	\$ 164,100	3.4%	\$ 0.29
100-200	152,528	11.3%	\$ 222,116	4.6%	\$ 1.46
200-300	94,035	7.0%	\$ 232,429	4.8%	\$ 2.47
300-1000	235,348	17.4%	\$ 1,292,699	26.9%	\$ 5.49
1000-2000	67,702	5.0%	\$ 919,511	19.1%	\$ 13.58
2000-5000	31,536	2.3%	\$ 898,966	18.7%	\$ 28.51
5000+	9,617	0.7%	\$ 1,075,655	22.4%	\$ 111.85
TOTAL	1,352,413	100.0%	\$ 4,805,476	100.0%	\$ 3.55


Note: Based on November 1995 billing records for United & Centel Florida, CTYT Centel of North Carolina, Ohio, United & Centel Texas Illinois and Missouri



^{*}Difference between current access rates and local termination proxy of \$.04/Mou




Interconnection Charge (RIC) Disaggregated by Customer Usage



Usage Segment MOU/Month	Access Lines	% of Total	RIC (Inter & Intra)	% of Total	RIC per Line
Residental					
0	70,447	2.5%	\$ -	0.0%	\$ -
0-100	767,815	27.2%	\$ 185,229.71	2.6%	\$ 0.24
100-200	442,665	15.7%	\$ 391,464.89	5.5%	\$ 0.88
200-300	324,892	11.5%	\$ 488,814.88	6.9%	\$ 1.50
300-1000	939,235	33.3%	\$ 3,194,457.44	45.2%	\$ 3.40
1000-2000	226,949	8.0%	\$ 1,866,694.63	26.4%	\$ 8.23
2000-5000	50,405	1.8%	\$ 828,011.64	11.7%	\$ 16.43
5000+	2,358	0.1%	\$ 114,554.23	1.6%	\$ 48.58
TOTAL	2,824,766	100%	 7,069,227	100.0%	\$ 2.50
Business					
0	193,955	14.3%	\$ -	0.0%	\$ -
0-100	567,692	42.0%	\$ 94,732	3.2%	\$ 0.17
100-200	152,528	11.3%	\$ 131,072	4.5%	\$ 0.86
200-300	94,035	7.0%	\$ 139,152	4.7%	\$ 1.48
300-1000	235,348	17.4%	\$ 787,014	26.7%	\$ 3.34
1000-2000	67,702	5.0%	\$ 565,253	19.2%	\$ 8.35
2000-5000	31,536	2.3%	\$ 560,256	19.0%	\$ 17.77
5000+	9,617	0.7%	\$ 667,707	22.7%	\$ 69.43
TOTAL	1,352,413	100.0%	\$ 2,945,186	100.0%	\$ 2.18

Note: Based on November 1995 billing records for United & Centel Florida, CT&T Centel of North Carolina, Ohio, United & Centel Texas, Illinois and Missouri





Total Access Subsidy Disaggregated


Usage	Access	% of	Access Subsidy	% of	Access Subsid
Segment	Lines	Total	(Inter & Intra)	Total	per Lin
Residental					
0	70,447	2.5%	\$ -	0.0%	\$ •
0-100	767,815	27.2%	\$ 1,175,135	3.0%	\$ 1.53
100-200	442,665	15.7%	\$ 2,360,336	6.0%	\$ 5.33
200-300	324,892	11.5%	\$ 2,862,445	7.3%	\$ 8.81
300-1000	939,235	33.3%	\$ 17,895,097	45.3%	\$ 19.05
1000-2000	226,949	8.0%	\$ 10,105,463	25.6%	\$ 44.53
2000-5000	50,405	1.8%	\$ 4,431,469	11.2%	\$ 87.92
5000+	2,358	0.1%	\$ 645,408	1.6%	\$ 273.71
TOTAL	2,824,766	100.0%	\$ 39,475,354	100.0%	\$ 13.97
Business					
0	193,955	14.3%	\$ -	0.0%	\$ -
0-100	567,692	42.0%	\$ 622,717	3.4%	\$ 1.10
100-200	152,528	11.3%	\$ 830,993	4.6%	\$ 5.45
200-300	94,035	7.0%	\$ 865,571	4.7%	\$ 9.20
300-1000	235,348	17.4%	\$ 4,790,106	26.2%	\$ 20.35
1000-2000	67,702	5.0%	\$ 3,423,659	18.7%	\$ 50.57
2000-5000	31,536	2.3%	\$ 3,452,473	18.9%	\$ 109.48
5000+	9,617	0.7%	\$ 4,277,683	23.4%	\$ 444.80
TOTAL	1,352,413	100.0%	\$ 18,263,202	100.0%	\$ 13.50

Note: Based on November 1995 billing records for United & Centel Florida, CT&T Centel of North Carolina, Ohio, United & Centel Texas, Illinois and Missouri





Sustainability Example: Carrier Common Line Charge



Recovery of NTS Loop Costs through per MOU Charge

- Results in high users contributing well in excess of the costs of their loops
- Providing incentive for IXCs (or CLECs) to "cap" the access costs of serving these customers by serving them through either non-ILEC facilities or resold ILEC loops


		CCLC Revenue	Unbundled	Access Savings to IXC
		Generated by Customer	Loop Cost	Net Revenue gain to CLEC
	Residential	\$46.33	\$20.00	\$26.33
	Customer			
i				
	Business	\$63.21	\$15.00	\$48.21
	Customer			





*Per FCC 96-98 Order

Comparison between IX Access and Local Interconnection Pricing









Revenue Impact of Pricing IX Access at Local Interconnection Levels (Industry Totals Interstate Only)





- *RIC Eliminated
- *Local Switching priced at .2c/MOU



Current Switched Access Revenues

\$11.2B Total

Switched

\$1.0B

Local

\$4.0B

RIC

\$2.8B

CCLC


\$3.4B

Switched Access Revenues at Local Interconnection Levels






SPRINT UNIVERSAL SERVICE PLAN



- Services Eligible for Subsidies
- Determination of Subsidy
- Costing Standard
- Eligibility Criteria for Receiving the Subsidy
- Implementation
- Funding
- Administration of Funds






SPRINT PLAN SPRINT UNIVERSAL SERVICE PLAN -- PRINCIPLES

- Competitive Neutrality
 - Should Not Impair Competition
 - All carriers should contribute to USF on an equitable basis
 - Subsidy Funding Should be Portable
 - Available to all qualified providers of local service
- Specific (Targeted)
- Predictable
- Fully Replace Current Internal (Implicit) Subsidy Flows, as well as Existing Explicit **Subsidy Funding**




SPRINT PLAN SERVICES ELIGIBLE FOR SUBSIDIES



- Residential Services Only
- Initial Service Definition
 - Local Dial Tone and Ability to Make Local Calls
 - Access to Chosen Long Distance Carrier
 - Access to Emergency Services
 - Single Party Service
 - Touch Tone
 - Annual Local Directory
 - Directory Assistance






SPRINT PLAN DETERMINATION OF SUBSIDY

- Income Related Subsidies
 - Lifeline, Linkup, and Other Explicit Subsidy
 Mechanisms to Support Low Income
 Subscribers Would Continue
- High Cost Area Subsidies
 - Available to Subsidize Basic Residential
 Service in Areas Where the Costs of
 Providing Service Exceed National and State
 Standard for "Affordable" Rate





SPRINT PLAN COSTING STANDARD FOR DETERMINING HIGH COST AREAS



- The BCM is a Reasonable Proxy for the Economic Costs of Serving a Particular Area
- Advantages of the BCM
 - Based on Objective, Verifiable, Public Data and Accepted Network Engineering Standards
 - Cost Results not Distorted by Historic Accounting and Depreciation Policies
 - Does Not Require Arbitrary Allocations or Dissagregations of Existing Investment to Smaller Geographic Units
 - Avoids Controversy Over Whether Embedded Costs Represent "Efficient" or "Inefficient" Management





SPRINT PLAN COSTING STANDARD FOR DETERMINING HIGH COST AREAS

Advantages of the BCM (continued)

- Competitively Neutral
 - Subsidy funding (per subscriber) will be the Same for all Service Providers
 - The BCM is a Proxy for the Costs that <u>Any Efficient Provider</u> would Incur in Providing Service to a Particular Area
 - Subsidy Amount Not biased by an Incumbent's Embedded Costs
 - Provides Incentive for Competitive Entry into High Cost Areas
 - Provides Incentive for Efficiency
 - Provides Incentive for Innovation






SPRINT PLAN COSTING STANDARD FOR DETERMINING HIGH COST AREAS

Advantages of the BCM (continued)

- Disaggregation of Costs By Census Block Group (CBG)
 - More Precisely Identifies Truly High Cost Areas
 - Avoids Competitive distortions Inherent in Using Higher Levels of Aggregation (e.g. exchange or study area) for USF Purposes
 - Basing Subsidies on Averaged Costs will not Provide New Entrants Sufficient Incentives to Serve Those Areas Where Costs Exceed the Average (potentially leading to "creamskimming")






SPRINT PLAN DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF SUBSIDY

- The Amount of Subsidy Provided for a CBG Would be the Difference Between
 - The National Benchmark Price for Basic Residential Service (i.e., the maximum rate determined to be "reasonable" and "affordable"), and the
 - BCM-Calculated Cost For that CBG
- The National Benchmark Price Should be Set at Least at the National Average Rate for Basic Residential Service in <u>Urban</u> areas, Including the Existing Subscriber Line Charge.
- State USF Plans Could Use the Same Methodology to the Extent State Repricing Does Not Resolve All State-Specific Subsidies





SPRINT PLAN DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF SUBSIDY: EXAMPLE



Assume:

Federal Subsidy (per Access Line)

1.	BCM Cost		\$30
_	TOOD 1	1 5	A A A

2. FCC Benchmark Price \$20

3. Federal Subsidy (L1-L2) \$10

State Subsidy (Per Access Line

4. 5	State Benchmark Price	\$15
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5. State Subsidy (L2-L4) \$5





SPRINT PLAN USF FUND SIZE AT ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL BENCHMARK PRICE LEVELS

Summary Model Results
National Total
(\$) (Billions)

Annual

Benchmark Cost

\$59,252

Aggregate Support

at \$20 \$14,666

at 30 \$7,425

at 40 \$4,259


Average

Monthly Cost \$29.98






SPRINT PLAN ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR RECEIVING THE FUNDING



- USF Funding Will be Available to Both Incumbent LECs and New Entrants
- To Qualify for USF Funding, an ETC (Eligible Telecommunications Carrier) Must:
 - Be Willing to Serve the Entire Service Area
 - Offer All of the Services that are Supported by the Fund
 - Use Their Own Facilities or a Combination of Owned Facilities and Resale of Another Carrier's Facilities
- An ETC Will Receive Support Only Where It Provides Service
 Either Over Its Own Facilities or Over Resold Facilities For Which
 It Pays Cost-Based Rates
- USF Support Should be Portable (When Subscribers Change Their Local Service Provider, the Subsidy Payment Should Then Go to the New Service Provider)



SPRINT PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

- The Expansion of USF Support Should
 - Replace Existing Implicit and Explicit Subsidies
 - Be Revenue Neutral to the Incumbent LEC at Time of Implementation
- Implementation Steps
 - Each Incumbent LEC Would Quantify its Net Change in USF
 Support (i.e., USF Support Under the New Plan Less USF
 Support it Received Under the Existing Plan)
 - The Incremental USF Funding Would Flow Through, Dollar for Dollar, in Reductions in Embedded Subsidies; e.g.,
 - ° CCLC
 - Transport RIC

